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Abstract 
Currently there is a strong trend toward sector-specific regulatory authorities across sectors and 
countries. However, liberalization has not led to a common European regulatory model. The 
circumstance that different old and new regulatory authorities exist in parallel not only raises agency 
problems, but also requires a horizontal coordination among the different authorities and their 
competences. The regulatory regimes differ in the degree to which regulatory authorities are upwardly 
accountable to governments, horizontally active alongside or related to courts and regulators, or 
downwardly responsible for operators and interest groups. Based on Williamson (1996, 2005) as well 
as on Spiller and Tommasi (2005) we try to develop conceptual foundations about the definition and 
identification of governance costs in regulatory regimes. Following our theoretical findings we explore 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Even though there is a strong trend toward independent sector specific regulatory authorities across 
sectors and countries, liberalization has not led to a general European regulatory model. Different 
countries exhibit different institutional endowments (in network industries in general and in the postal 
sector in particular), which in turn lead to different regulatory practices. The creation of new 
independent and sector-specific regulatory agencies gives rise to a potentially important agency 
problem: Regulators may well tend to act in their own interests and contrary to the intentions with 
which they were originally established. In such a dynamic context where regulatory authorities behave 
as self-interested social actors1, regulators start to strategize vis-à-vis the other actors so as to increase 
their own discretionary power and become part of economic interaction they were supposed to govern. 
Furthermore the circumstance that different old and new regulatory authorities exist in parallel not 
only raises potential vertical agency problems, because they are governed at different levels, but also 
requires a horizontal coordination among the different authorities. Coen (2005) observes that newly 
created independent authorities deal differently with different institutional arrangements in different 
countries. Through the lens of transaction cost economics as well as agency theory, different modes of 
regulation can be described as alternative modes of governance which are well suited for some 
objectives but purely suited for others. Regulatory intervention in general has two comprehensive 
objectives with respect to (1) market power and (2) public goods: the first objective is to stimulate the 
effects of competition where competition is inexistent or poor. Such monopolistic (or oligopolistic) 
structures are dominant in network industries or financial services and often linked to former (or still) 
state-owned companies. The second, almost complementary, objective is to enforce outcomes not 
appearing under conditions of full competition, e.g. by providing universal services (OECD 2005, 
p.31).2
Williamson (1998) points out that there exists no superior mode of organization and within the 
different frameworks transaction costs vary in their attributes as well as governance structures vary in 
their costs and the alignment of competences within the system. The variations of strategic behaviour 
and incentives across different actors play a significant role in terms of the evolution of regulatory 
institutions and governance costs (transaction costs) within a regulatory regime.  
In this paper we explore the Swiss postal regulatory regime and its institutional framework (rules and 
actors). Our focus is on the identification of the institutional design and potential governance costs in 
the specific setting of Switzerland. Our main research questions are:  
• What is the design of the Swiss postal regulatory regime ? 
• How to identify and determine governance costs in a regulatory regime with multiple regulatory 
authorities? 
The article shows how governance costs and institutions in regulatory regimes are affected by the 
involved authorities from a theoretical perspective in general and in the specific institutional setting of 
Switzerland in particular. 
                                                     
1  Actors react differently to external threats, constraints and opportunities because they differ in their intrinsic 
perceptions and preferences but also because these are shaped by the specific institutional setting within 
which they interact (Scharpf 1997, p. 37). Crozier (1964) interprets such a behavior as “the active tendency 
of human agent to take advantage, in any circumstances, of all available means to further his own privileges” 
(p.194).  
2  The presented research project, discusses regulation in terms of regulated network industries in general and 
the postal sector in particular. 
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 2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS:  
The Regulatory system’s design consists of (1) the objectives of infrastructure regulation (its purposes 
and functions); and (2) the specific institutional framework for regulation (Stern and Holder 1999, p. 
34). The first aspect is concerned with the theory of regulatory governance while the second aspect is 
concerned with the design of regulatory institutions.  
2.1 An Overview on Regulatory Governance 
In their seminal article on institutional foundations of regulatory commitment, Levy and Spiller (1994) 
emphasize that there are multiple regulatory regimes which are consistent with good performance. 
They define regulatory governance from an institutional perspective as “the mechanisms that societies 
use to constrain regulatory discretion and to resolve conflicts that arise in relation to these constraints.” 
The main question concerning regulatory governance is how to design a regulatory framework that 
allows governments to maintain control over a regulated sector.  
Majone (1996, p. 2) discusses traditional forms of regulation and control (regulatory governance 
structures) in Europe including public ownership, the assignment of regulatory functions to 
departments of governments under direct control of political executives, and various self-regulatory 
arrangements. These modes of regulation are gradually displaced because regulatory policies are 
nowadays rarely implemented by politicians themselves. Governments delegate regulatory 
competencies to specialized authorities. Independent sector-specific regulatory authorities are a 
relatively recent phenomenon and in just a decade they have become widespread in Europe 
(Braun/Gilardi 2006, S.10). But even though a strong trend toward independent regulatory authorities 
across sectors and countries was observed, liberalization has not led yet to a unified European 
regulatory model. One might argue, that the independent sector specific regulator represents the new 
regulatory model. Most of the new institutional arrangements do indeed have at their core an 
independent sector specific regulator, but there are still significant differences among countries. The 
comparison of different independent authorities shows that they rely on completely different 
institutional backgrounds and arrangements. Coen (2005) points out that newly created independent 
authorities learn to deal with different institutional arrangements in different countries. This implies 
that independent regulatory authorities exhibit different behaviours in different regulatory 
arrangements. He points out that regulators “differ in the degree to which they are upwardly 
accountable to governments, horizontally accountable to courts and regulators, or downwardly 
accountable to business (p. 394)”.  
Wilks and Bartle (2002) argue that the original decision to delegate and the design of agencies were 
primarily motivated by a need to reassure and to appear to act. The agencies were not expected to be 
extremely active in developing and implementing policies. However, the regulatory agencies have 
become more active than expected and have contributed to policies (p.148). Wilks and Bartle further 
state that “the consequences of creating agencies has been to populate the policy area with actors 
(agents) who have their own priorities, interpretations and influence (p. 148)”. Spiller and Tommasi 
(2005) emphasize a shift away from investigating regulation as a pure government/firm game. The 
agency is by definition created as an entity to be independent from governmental, and consequently 
from political, influence. Spiller (1990) points out that regulators do not fully respond to governmental 
desires and raises the question: “Why does Congress delegate regulatory issues to agencies that are not 
fully aligned with it and what are the implications of delegation for regulatory commitment?” 
(Spiller/Tommasi 2005, p. 531).  
An explanation according to the phenomenon of delegation is given by Majone (2001) as well as 
Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2003): Following their comments, the aim of delegating regulatory issues 
to agencies is to establish market and technical expertise, blame-shifting potential, and credible 
commitment to efficient market developments. However, creating an independent regulatory agency 
gives rise to a potentially important problem: agencies may act in their own interests and contrary to 
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 the objectives and policies established for the original political intent (McCubbens, Noll, Weingast, 
1989, p. 246). 
Concerning the control of regulatory agencies Weingast and Moran (1983) develop the “Congressional 
Dominance” hypothesis which implies that independent agencies are not fully independent. The 
circumstance that agencies underlie permanent congressional oversight raises potential agency 
problems. Perfect oversight would require congressional instruments to be powerful enough to fully 
control the regulatory agency. Agency problems between government and regulatory agencies occur 
because regulators actions are intrinsically unobservable. Gilardi (2005) states that governments 
usually lack control mechanisms which enable them to have an effective and direct impact on the 
regulatory agency’s behavior. Hence the specialized independent and sector-specific agencies are, 
unlike ordinary bureaucracy, difficult to control.  
2.2 Conceptual Background: Institutions and Actors in Regulatory 
Regimes 
Willman et al. (2003, p.73) criticize the purely economic approach to regulation: the economic 
approach to the design of institutions tends to focus on outcome, rather than the analysis of the 
process. Therefore it does not adopt a dynamic perspective on institutional change. It is prescriptive 
rather than analytical, and it focuses on the properties of institutions rather than taking the regulatory 
relationship as a unit of analysis. Finally, it considers the firm as a single decision point which seeks 
return on investments whereas the analysis of regulatory activity within an organization is neglected.  
Concerning the theory of regulatory economics, Laffont and Tirole (1993) criticize the fact that 
economic theory ignores incentive issues to a large extend, and the theory does not consider the 
standards of the newly developed principal-agent theory. They further argue that the simplified 
economic models, which ignored the presence of imperfect information, were unrealistic because they 
implied policy recommendations that require information which is not available to regulatory 
authorities in practice. Laffont and Tirole (2000) abandon the standard economic assumption which 
defines regulators as well-informed and benevolent actors whose mission is to perfect an imperfect 
market and to achieve the best results for society. They argue that regulators, like other economic 
actors, are self-interested: “They, like anybody, must be provided with incentives to become 
(economic and technological) experts, to think hard about specific regulatory issues and to shun 
putting their career concerns or the stakes of their favored interest groups or causes first (p.274)”. 
2.2.1 New Institutional Economics 
The analysis of institutions and the part they play in the governance of economic action is the central 
challenge addressed by new institutional economics (NIE).3 The theoretical framework of new 
institutional economics links different approaches to explain economic activities and economic 
behavior. The three main areas are “Transaction Cost Theory”, “Property Rights Theory” and 
“Agency Theory”. New institutional economics builds on, modifies, and extends neoclassical theory. 
It has developed as a movement within the social sciences, especially economics and political science 
which unites theoretical as well as empirical research and addresses the role of institutions in shaping 
“the different arrangements that support production and exchange, as well as how these arrangements 
act in turn to change the rule of the game (Ménard/ Shirley 2005, p.2)”. The aim of new economic 
institutionalism is to understand changes by understanding human incentives, intention, and beliefs, as 
well as the norms and rules they create to reach their goals. Taking an institutional perspective, the key 
elements of regulatory frameworks are institutions (in the form of rules) and actors. Ménard and 
                                                     
3  An overview on the current discussion in NIE and modes of organization is given by Ménard (2005). 
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 Shirley (2005, p.1) define institutions as the written and unwritten norms, rules and constraints that 
humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control the environment. North (1994, 2005) denotes 
institutions as the rules of the game, not only the formal but also the informal norms and the 
characteristics of enforcement. The dominant actors in regulated network industries are governments, 
regulatory authorities, incumbent firms, new entrants and several interest groups. Behaviorists in 
political science argue that, in order to understand politics and explain political outcomes (such as 
regulatory policy) research should not only focus on the formal attributes of government institutions 
but also on the informal distribution of power, attitudes, and behavior among the actors 
(Thelen/Steinmo 1992, p.4). Williamson (2005, p.41), describes transaction cost economics as an 
effort to better understand sophisticated economic organization by alternatively linking economics, 
law and organization theory. Williamson (1996) summarizes that different modes of governance vary 
with the institutional environment on the one hand, and with the economic actors’ attributes on the 
other hand (p. 223). Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) describe transaction costs economics as an 
approach for comparative institutional analysis where a given set of transactions may be characterized 
by its variety of costs; and different modes of governance might affect the level of these costs. In their 
perspective the task of the transaction cost approach is to predict how optimal governance structures 
change as the formation of transaction costs changes. In his article “Transaction Cost Economics: How 
it works; Where is it is Headed” Williamson (1998) then points out that there exists no superior mode 
of organization and within the different frameworks transaction costs vary in their attributes as well as 
governance structures vary in their costs and the alignment of competences within the system.  
Considering regulated industries, the view with emphasis on transaction costs is related to the 
principal agent framework. It assumes that heterogeneous parties, politicians, bureaucrats and courts, 
will act with limited or asymmetric information in bargaining processes. The principal Agent theory is 
grounded on studies in information asymmetries. The construct of bounded rationality takes the 
disability of economic actors to obtain perfect information into account. There are three environmental 
conditions according to information problems: Adverse selection, moral hazard and hold up. All of 
them are underlying to a certain problem of coordination and motivation. Adverse selection bears the 
risk of principals of selecting the wrong contractual partner. Moral hazard contains the risk that a 
party does not enter into a contract in good faith (opportunistic behaviour). While hold up problems 
cause the purposely, asymmetrically distributed information by individuals to raise individual gains.  
However, Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002, p.2) notice that Principal Agent Theories remain an 
incomplete theory because they do not consider organizational and interorganizational dimensions 
within regulatory frameworks. Our aim is to develop a more dynamic perspective that considers 
organizational and actor-specific dimensions to explain how institutions evolve over time and actors 
try to shape their environment. Therefore the second conceptual pillar is organizational behavior 
theory. 
2.2.2 Organizational Behavior Theory 
Organizational behavior theory is interested in how and why the behavior of organizations changes 
over time. Concerning regulatory governance the theory implies that regulatory authorities will not 
simply stick to their original goal. Rather, they will displace their original goal or add new goals to the 
original one, especially if not actively monitored and supervised by the political authorities. Martimort 
(1999) suggests, that in a dynamic context, the regulator starts to strategize vis-à-vis all stakeholders 
so as to increase its own discretionary power. Crozier (1964) interprets such an opportunistic behavior 
as “the active tendency of human agent to take advantage, in any circumstances, of all available means 
to further his own privileges” (p.194). Bonardi et al. (2006) suggest that agency decisions can have 
important consequences for stakeholders (especially firms) and that agencies behave differently from 
elected political institutions. Regulators are generally appointed rather than elected. Therefore they do 
not face the election constraints that typically motivate elected politicians’ behavior. Prior research 
highlights, that regulatory agencies’ objective functions are multidimensional: regulators tend to 
maximize their budgets, enlarge the number of employees or enhance career prospects and political 
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 reputations (Bonardi et al. 2006; Mueller 2003; Wheaterby 1971). Majone (1996) summarizes that the 
achievement of such objectives depends on the legitimacy that the regulator holds within the 
institutional framework. He defines the preservation and the enhancement of legitimacy as a meta-
objective of regulators.  
2.3 Preliminary Conclusion 
Following the explanations we conclude that new institutional economics in general and transaction 
cost economics in combination with principal-agent and organizational behavior theory in particular 
provide a useful framework to explore regulatory governance structures or more precisely to analyze 
different institutional settings in regulatory regimes. Libecap (2005, p. 551) explains that the 
consideration of transaction costs supports the analysis of how sets of regulation take the form they do. 
New institutional economics facilitate the understanding of actual human as well as organizational 
behavior, institutions and resource outcomes. In order to explain the coherence between organizational 
theory and new institutional economics Williamson (1996) comes to the conclusion that “the 
economics of governance needs to be informed both from the level of the institutional environment 
(where sociology has a lot to contribute) and the level of the individual (where psychology is 
implicated). The intertemporal process transformations that take place within the institutions of 
governance (with respect to which organization theory has a lot to say) are also pertinent (p. 245)”.  
3. COSTS OF GOVERNANCE IN REGULATORY REGIMES 
Regulatory governance has a significant cost which is raised by the various actors within an 
institutional framework in unequal ways. This overall governance cost is in our view still largely 
underestimated or even ignored. Furthermore, it is also obvious from even simple empirical 
observation that the sector specific regulator is not a neutral actor promoting market perfection in a 
disinterested way. Our substantial challenge is the conceptualization and the construction of 
governance costs. Even though we will not come to final conclusion in this paper, we try to shape the 
conceptualization of governance costs and its drivers in regulatory regimes. 
3.1 Perspectives on Regulatory Structures 
From an institutional point of view, we define governance costs as the costs of running a regulatory 
framework. This includes the costs of coordination as well as costs of gathering information within a 
system. Regarding an organizational perspective, the costs of running a regulatory system are as well 
raised by the behavior of the individual actors vis-à-vis the other involved actors within a particular 
regulatory system. The key elements of regulatory frameworks are rules (institutions) and actors. 
Table 1 summarizes the two different dimensions of regulatory governance and the different sources 
of governance costs. The first rather institutional perspective stresses formal rules in terms of 
institutions in the regulatory setting. The second perspective is focusing on the actors and their 
behavior within the system. It is determined by the formal organization of an institutional actor as well 
as on the informal rules and its behavior vis-à-vis other actors. The design of rules defines what actors 
do or what they are not allowed to do. They shape the competences, the accountability, and the formal 
relationships between the actors within the regulatory framework.  
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 Table 1: Dimensions of governance structures and sources of costs. 
• Incentives and 
goals
• Strategy
• Information 
exchange
• Staffing policy
• Disclosure of data
• Political attitudes
• Informal 
coordination with 
actors
• Budget
• Staff size
• Internal
organization
• Legal personality
• Regulatory competence
• Advisory/Supervisory power
• Coordination with other
authorities
• Coordination with courts
• Reporting requirements
• Funding sources
• Legal remedies
• Objectives of regulatory policy
Attributes :
Behavior and informal 
rules
Formal OrganizationFormal RulesAnalysis of :
Actors: 
Organizational Behavior
Institutions: 
The Institutional Structure
Relevant 
Subject:
Dimensions of 
Regulatory Governance Structures and Sources of Governance Costs
 
3.2 Regulatory Authorities: Behavior 
Before we start the analysis of institutions respectively formal rules, we line out the assumptions 
behind the perspective of organizational behavior. Analyzing the state of research in the field of 
regulatory governance it is generally accepted that regulatory agencies cause principal agent 
problems.4 However, the circumstance that different old and new regulatory authorities exist in 
parallel not only raises potential agency problems, because they fall under governmental oversight and 
monitor the other economic players, but also requires a horizontal coordination among the different 
authorities and their competences. In other words, a sector specific regulator relates to and defines 
itself in relationship to its surrounding actors (such as the firms that are to be regulated, consumer 
protection associations, the government, the administration, the competition regulator, the parliament, 
as well as the other regulators who do similar things in other countries) by way of a complex system of 
formal and informal rules, which constitute its external incentive structure. Figure 1 illustrates the 
context within which regulatory authorities behave as self-interested social actors and start to 
strategize vis-à-vis the other actors so as to increase their own discretionary power. Seeking to 
increase their power, they might rely on several instruments which are actually partly (but not 
completely) described by new institutional economics and related to informational problems. The 
emergence of several forms of opportunistic behavior and asymmetric information becomes intuitively 
comprehensible. We assume that the implications of transaction costs and agency theory on regulation 
theory and practice are particularly relevant, but remain - save for a few exceptions mentioned in the 
literature review - widely unexplored. 
Therefore we formulate the proposition that the independent regulatory agency is a discrete actor 
which not only acts benevolently, but also pursues its own interests. Hence the regulatory agency does 
not stand above the sector, but acts as a social actor whose behavior in turn affects the institutional 
environment and the regulatory regime’s design. 
                                                     
4  See Section 2. 
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 Government and Administration
Regulator(s)
Incumbent EntrantsInterest Groups
Market
Ministry/ Departments/ Parliament
Regulatory Authorities
Diection of regulator‘s strategy
 
Figure 1: The regulatory authority as a discrete actor within the regulatory regime. 
Describing the regulatory agencies as self interested actors implies that their behavior affect 
governance costs within the regulatory regime. Such a finding, derived from a combination of new 
institutional economics and organizational behavior theory, diverges from older standard regulatory 
economics, which considers regulators to be totally neutral (i.e., not self-interested) whose aim is to 
perfect an inherently imperfect market.5 It is fair to say that regulatory authorities will seek to increase 
their discretionary power by using all instruments at their disposal, such as uncertainty vis-à-vis the 
operators they regulate, goal displacement, or goal multiplication. They will also try to increase their 
discretionary power by trying to shape the rules under which they operate. This is made even easier if 
regulators simultaneously have policy advice functions, as it is the case in the in Swiss postal and in 
other sectors.  
4. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING IN THE SWISS POSTAL SECTOR  
The example of postal market regulation in Switzerland is chosen because it is particularly interesting 
institutional framework from a governance perspective: three different regulatory authorities are 
divided into two cross-sectoral regulators and a sector specific postal regulation authority, reporting to 
different ministries. 
4.1 Regulatory Framework in Switzerland 
The responsible ministry for the postal sector is the Federal Department for Environment, Transport, 
Energy and Communication (DETEC). Other involved ministries are the Department of Finance 
(FDF) and the Department of Economic Affairs (FDEA). As the State is the formal owner of the 
incumbent postal operator Swiss Post, the Federal Council, respectively the FDF is involved with the 
financial control of the incumbent and responsible for the appropriation of its profits. 
The central regulatory authority in the postal sector is the postal services regulation authority 
(PostReg). Other participating actors are the Competition Comission (ComCo) with its secretariat and 
the price supervisor which are both functionally independent but organizationally accountable to the 
FDEA.  
                                                     
5  Cf. Laffont/ Tirole 1993, 2000. 
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 PostReg is functionally independent but attached to the DETEC. As an independent regulatory 
authority PostReg monitors the Swiss postal market and ensures the provision of universal services, in 
terms of high quality and at affordable prices. The authority deals with complaints by the public 
relating to universal services, and ensures a fair and functioning competition in the opening postal 
market. Other responsibilities are the drafting of Federal Council and DETEC decisions (policy 
advice) and representing Switzerland in international organizations. 
The Competition Commission is a group of 11-15 experts from different disciplines in charge of 
competition regulation in the classical sense (ex-post regulatory intervention in anti-trust and abuse of 
dominant position matters). The main tasks are the elimination of harmful cartels, monitoring 
dominant or monopolistic companies for signs of anti-competitive behavior, enforcing merger control 
legislation and preventing the imposition of restraints of competition by the state. The Commission is 
supported by a substantial full-time secretariat. It examines the suspected cartels and prepares the 
decisions for the ComCo. 
Dep. of the
Environment,Transport, 
Energy,  Communication
Dep. of Economic Affairs Dep. of Finance
Regulatory Agency Competition Comission Price Supervisor
Incumbent
Entrant
Interest Groups
Consumers (B&C)
Entrant
Administration
Regulatory Authorities
Market
Institutions: Formal and informal rules
Federal Council (Government)
 
Figure 2: the institutional setting in Switzerland. 
As mentioned above Switzerland knows the function of the so-called price supervisor, who has the 
power to sanction prices in the public sector as well as among firms with significant market power in 
an ex-ante manner. For example the prices in the reserved postal services (2007: addressed domestic 
letters up to 100g) are set by the DETEC on recommendation of the price supervisor and PostReg. 
The incumbent operator Swiss Post is set up as an autonomous public corporation, wholly owned by 
the Swiss Confederation. It operates within the institutional limits laid down by the federal legislation. 
The Government not only determines the scope of postal products and services but also defines the 
strategic objectives of Swiss Post every four years.  
The institutional framework respectively the formal rules in the Swiss postal sector are determined by 
the postal act of 1997 and its modification decree of 2004 and the federal ordinance 2004. Swiss Post’s 
organization is defined by the act on postal organization. Following the details mentioned above, there 
exists a substantial problem according to property rights, legislation and regulatory governance 
structures:  The government is still the owner of the incumbent operator in the postal sector but also 
does not clearly distinguish between regulation of the sector and principal-agent type intervention in 
its own enterprise. 
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 4.2 The Swiss Model: Pricing Products in Universal Services 
Different regulators pursuit different objectives and appraise different issues when they assess prices 
of universal postal services. Even though the addressed stakeholders are often the same, interests 
concerning prices are not necessarily the same. In this section we show how different regulators, parts 
of federal administration and the federal council are in charge of pricing and assess postal universal 
services in the reserved and in the liberalized (nonreserved) area.  
The reserved area contains addressed domestic and inbound letters up to a weight of 100 g. 
Nonreserved universal services are addressed letters (domestic and inbound) heavier than 100 g, 
parcels up to 20 kilo and all outbound letters. 
4.3 Pricing Universal Service: The Formal Procedure and the Involved 
Actors 
The formal procedure of price setting is institutionally regulated in the postal act. Thus the postal 
operator sets the price in the nonreserved areas based on economic principles. And The Price 
Supervisor asses if prices are incorrect due to abuse of market power and predatory pricing. 
Prices in the reserved area underlie the authorization of DETEC. The sector specific regulator PostReg 
has no formal power to decree but gives recommendations and prepares DETEC’s final decision. 
PostReg is interested in maintaining or even improving service quality at affordable prices for private 
and business consumers. PostReg’s most important appraisal issues in the regulatory pricing process 
are Swiss post’s operating costs, the quality of services (end to end delivery times, and customer 
satisfaction) and international price comparisons. The price supervisor, whose ultimate ambition is to 
establish fair prices for private consumers, has no formal power to decree in price setting in the 
reserved area, but he is involved in the price assessment proceedings with an advisory function. He - 
like PostReg – gives recommendations concerning the price level to the DETEC. The Supervisor’s 
most important appraisal issue concerning the prices of public services in the reserved area is the 
adequacy of Swiss post’s profits. Once he considers that the profits are beyond a certain adequate 
level, he will argue that postal services are overpriced. The competion commission gets involved in an 
ex post manner in case of predatory pricing of operators. But since both – PostReg and Mr. Price – are 
not legitimated to change and fix prices, one might ask which instruments are used to enforce their 
recommendation vis-à-vis the other involved actors? The media: They are not directly involved in the 
process of price setting, but they play a particularly important role in this institutional game. 
Regulators instrumentalize the media and their activity reports to make themselves heard. Therefore 
they are used as an endogenous instrument by the regulators. 
9 
 Table 2: Pricing products in universal services - different actors have different backgrounds. 
• Defines strategic 
goals of Swiss post
• Final decision on 
allocation of profits 
• Postal act
• Postal ordinance
• Postal organization 
act
• Service quality
• Price
• Incumbent’s profit
• Sourcing of USO
•Sustainable 
provision of 
public service
•Consistency of 
regulators 
objectives
•Allocation of 
profits
• Formal power to 
decree: abuse of 
market power
• recommendation to 
the gov. in reserved 
area
• Media
• Federal act on price 
supervision 
? attached to FDEA
? ultimate authority: 
Federal court
• Development of 
costs
• Price history
• Consumer requests
• Appropriate profit 
of operator
• “Fair Prices” for 
private 
consumers
•Prohibition of 
price abuse
• No formal power to 
decree 
Recommendation to 
gov.
• Media
• Reports
• Postal ordinance
• Postal act
• Postal organization 
act
? attached to DETEC
? ultimate authority:
DETEC
• Operating costs
• Service quality
• Int. price 
comparison
•High quality of 
service at 
affordable prices
•Prohibition of 
cross‐
subsidization
•Enabling 
competition
Competences & 
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Institutional 
BackgroundAppraisal IssuesObjective
Po
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e 
Su
pe
rv
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l C
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Yet another institutional actor that is not fully involved but is non the less interested in the pricing 
procedures is the federal council. The objective concerning the public service is the sustainable 
provision of area-wide postal universal services with high quality. A second objective is the 
coordination of the different regulatory authorities, which are organizationally attached to different 
departments. The third task of the federal council is the definition of Swiss Post’s strategic objectives 
and the allocation of its profits. The decision on the allocation of profits also includes the cash-flow 
from Swiss post to the federal treasury. The first payout from Swiss post to the federal treasury is due 
to Swiss post’s profits in 2007 (300 Mio CHF). Since there is a cash flow from Swiss post to the 
government, the price Supervisor argues, that these 300 Mio. are not an appropriate profit and could 
be redistributed to private consumers. Table 2 exemplifies by means of PostReg, the price supervisor 
and the federal council how actors differ in their objectives, the appraisal issues, the institutional 
background, and competences in pricing products of universal services.    6
4.4 Conflicts and Institutional Challenges Concerning the Swiss Example 
The comparison of the different actors and their background shows, that the Swiss postal regulatory 
arrangement bears some institutional as well as behavioral conflicts: 
A first conflict is due to the involvement of two (or even three in the nonreserved area) regulators in 
pricing procedures: concerning the pricing of universal services in the reserved area, they have no 
formal power to decree. The competences of regulators are overlapping and not clearly distinguished.   
                                                     
6  The full overview on all regulators, the administration and the federal council is in the appendix. 
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 Even though the media are not directly involved in the process of setting prices, they play a 
particularly important role in this institutional game. They are used as an endogenous instrument by 
the regulators. Since PostReg and the Price Supervisor have no formal power of decision and are just 
allowed to make recommendations, they instrumentalize the media and their activity reports to 
proclaim their importance and to strategize vis-à-vis the other involved actors. The Price Supervisor is 
even institutionally obliged to inform the public about his activities. 
A third conflict arises because both, the federal council and the price supervisor are interested in the 
incumbent’s profit. The Price supervisor assesses if the profit is appropriate. In his perspective high 
profits imply too high prices and earnings could be redistributed to the consumers. The federal council 
defines the strategic objectives of Swiss Post and is interested in the cash flow from Swiss Post to the 
federal treasury. In 2008 these are 300 million Swiss francs. 
Conflicts one and two have a rather behavioral background with its origin in the institutional setting. 
The third conflict is purely institutional. Even though this is one particular example, it shows that there 
are conflicts concerning the competences of involved regulators, the strategic instruments they use, 
and the design of the institutional framework. 
An institutional challenge related to the institutional design in the Swiss postal sector is the current 
postal law reform and the future design of the regulatory framework: The Federal Council has decided 
to revise the federal postal act and the act on postal organization in order to liberalize and enforce 
competition in the postal sector. The postal act defines the institutions - the formal rules - of the game. 
And the Postal organization act defines the formal organization, conditions, and objectives of one 
single actor (Swiss Post). 
 
1. Federal Postal Act 
? symmetric: all operators 
• Competition 
• (Timing) Market opening 
• Freedoms & requirements  
• relationships/ interconnection 
• Access 
• Definition and Financing of USO
• Sector specific regulator 
2. Postal Organization Act  
? asymmetric: Swiss Post 
• Legal form 
• Corporate objective  
• Conditions of employment 
• Regional obligations 
• Strategic objectives 
Figure 3: Asymmetries in the proposed postal law reform. 
The proposal of the federal postal act is symmetric because it contains rules for all operators. The draft 
involves e.g. the symmetric regulation of competition and access. The federal act on postal 
organization is purely asymmetric and regulates just the incumbent operator and determines the legal 
form, conditions of employment and even strategic objectives of the incumbent. New market entrants 
will not be affected by these asymmetric obligations. Such an institutional framework will bear new 
institutional conflicts within the regulatory system, because some rules are addressed to all operators 
and others are only directed to the incumbent operator.  
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 5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we address the concept of governance costs in regulatory arrangements. We assume that 
regulatory governance has a significant cost which we define as governance costs of a regulatory 
system. These governance costs are inherently present in regulatory arrangements and influenced by 
the various actors within a regulatory framework in unequal ways. We are focusing in particular on the 
role of the regulators and their relationships (among each other and to their principals in the federal 
administration and the government).  
By analyzing the institutional setting in the Swiss postal sector and the process of pricing products of 
universal services, we identify several institutional conflicts and challenges.  
1. The Swiss regulatory arrangement in the postal sector is particularly complex in terms of the 
division of powers because three different regulatory authorities are divided into two cross-sectoral 
regulators and a sector specific postal regulation authority, reporting to different ministries. The 
competences of the regulators are overlapping and not well-defined.  
2. We observe some conflicts concerning the (1) competences of involved regulators, (2) strategic 
instruments, and (3) the institutional framework. The conflicts have their origin in behavioral 
features as well as in institutional circumstances.  
One might ask how conflicts like the ones mentioned above are related to governance costs. We argue 
that the identification of the conflicts among actors in regulatory regime could be a solution to track 
sources of governance costs and to gain insights on how actors strategize vis-à-vis others. We assume 
that these costs are not easy to quantify. Considering our proposition - regulatory agencies are self 
interested actors and their behavior affects governance costs - we argue that the definition of 
governance costs goes beyond existing theories, such as transaction costs and agency theory, and it 
should involve aspects of organizational behavior. 
So far we are able to identify two different dimensions that contribute to the construct of governance 
costs: the first dimension is rather institutional and is related to the formal rules and the institutional 
structure of the regulated sector. Concerning the regulators it includes issues like the formal 
competences and the objectives of regulatory policy. The second perspective is much more actor-
centered and related to organizational behavior theory: it implies that governance costs are affected by 
informal rules and the strategic behavior of regulators which have their own objectives and political 
attitudes.  
6. LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The main limitation in the present article is that we are not yet able to provide a distinct definition of 
governance costs in regulatory regimes. Therefore a challenge for future research is to come up with a 
clearly defined conceptualization of governance costs.  
In order to clarify how future research can contribute to the conceptualization of governance costs in 
regulatory regimes in combination with the role of regulators we formulate the following questions: 
• What are the objectives of regulators? 
• What are the strategies of regulators? 
• What are the consequences for the evolution of regulatory arrangements and governance costs? 
An unsolved problem concerning behavioral aspects is the identification and conceptualization of 
informal attributes like e.g. strategies, objectives and informal relationships of involved actors.  
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 The contribution of this kind of research will be to better integrate regulatory authorities in the 
institutional framework of regulation, the understanding of their behavior, and finally to explain how 
agencies’ behavior affects the regulatory institutions and governance costs within a regulatory 
framework. 
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